


THE ROLE OF FIELD ARTILLERY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS



Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the US Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF FIELD ARTILLERY IN COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS, by
MAJ Patrovick G. Everett, 71 pages.

This thesis describes how field artillery fires should be planned and executed in a counterinsurgency fight. Based upon historical research, there are numerous missions that the field artillery community can and must be able to execute in a counterinsurgency fight in order to be successful. Field artillery fires are still relevant on the battlefield, and leaders at all levels must understand how to properly employ them in order to apply the appropriate force required to defeat the enemy and at the same time attempt to minimize the collateral damage that a misplaced artillery round can cause. Additionally this thesis addresses some of the transformational issues that the field artillery community must be aware of in the current fight.

Artillery is not going to win the hearts and minds of those local nationals who are neither supportive to an insurgency organization nor against it, but it will provide the protection for the Soldiers on the battlefield. Artillery fires are needed in the current counterinsurgency fight in Iraq.

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ACRONYMS

| | |
|---------|---|
| AOR | Area of Operations |
| BCT | Brigade Combat Team |
| BSB | Brigade Support Battalion |
| CAS | Close Air Support |
| COIN | Counterinsurgency |
| D3A | Decide, Detect, Deliver, and Assess |
| DIME | Diplomatic Information Military Economic |
| DOD | Department of Defense |
| DIVARTY | Division Artillery |
| DS | Direct Support |
| EBO | Effects Based Operations |
| FA | Field Artillery |
| FEC | Fires and Effects Cell |
| FECC | Fires and Effects Coordination Cell |
| FID | Foreign Internal Defense |
| FM | Field Manual |
| FOB | Forward Operating Base |
| FSB | Fire Support Base |
| FSCOORD | Fire Support Coordinator |
| FSE | Fire Support Element |
| FSO | Fire Support Officer |
| FSS | Fire Support Section |
| G3 | Assistant Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans |

| | |
|--------|--------------------------------------|
| GMLRS | Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System |
| GPS | Global Positioning System |
| GS | General Support |
| GSR | General Support Reinforcing |
| HN | Host Nation |
| HPT | High Payoff Target |
| HUMINT | Human Intelligence |
| HVT | High Value Target |
| IDAD | Internal Defense and Development |
| JFACC | Joint Forces Air Component Commander |
| JP | Joint Publication |
| LIC | Low-Intensity Conflict |
| MAAG | Military Assistance Advisory Groups |
| METL | Mission Essential Task List |
| MLRS | Multiple-Launch Rocket System |
| MOE | Measures of Effectiveness |
| MOOTW | Military Operations Other Than War |
| MOS | Military Occupational Specialty |
| ROAD | Reorganized Objective Army Division |
| ROE | Rules of Engagement |
| ST | Student Text |
| TPP | Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures |

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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This thesis proposes to determine how and when leaders need to incorporate field artillery fire support assets into the counterinsurgency fight. Looking at how field artillery fires were used in past counterinsurgency battles, the intent of this thesis is to determine whether or not field artillery fires are useful in counterinsurgency operations on today's battlefield. The thesis also intends to give a better understanding of what it takes to engage and win the battle against insurgents using small-unit tactics while incorporating field artillery fire support assets to decisively defeat the enemy while simultaneously causing minimal collateral damage. The mission of the field artillery is to destroy, neutralize, or suppress the enemy by cannon, rocket, or missile fires and to integrate all fire support assets into combined arms operations.

Background

The United States (US) military has been fighting wars and dealing with insurgencies for a long time, and history has shown that not only is the US military transforming, but the insurgents are also transforming the way that they do business. Because of this the field artillery community must also not only transform with the rest of the military, but it must transform the way it must operate on a daily basis. Today the field artillery must still be able to place accurate fires where they are needed in a timely manner.

In the words of Shaun Hancock, “It was a tough transformation, going from MLRS to infantry tactics. It was a growing process for our squad--a long training

process" (2005, 29). This comment reflects a new reality for the artillery. Some artillery units are being taken off of the gunline and becoming military police units, transportation units, and performing as infantry maneuver forces because of either the lack of missions for the field artillery in the current insurgency fight in Iraq, the sheer shortage that brigade combat teams have with respect to maneuver units or the critical shortage the Army has with providing convoy security escorts and transportation assets available to assist in sustainment operations in Iraq.

However repugnant the idea is to liberal societies, the man who will willingly defend the free world in the fringe areas is not the responsible citizen-soldier. The man woe will go were his colors go, without asking, who will fight a phantom foe in jungle and mountain range, without counting, and who will suffer and die in the midst of incredible hardship, without complaint, is still what he has always been, from Imperial Rome to sceptered Britain to democratic America. He is the stuff which legions are made. (Fehrenbach 1963, 658)

The Soldier on the ground is the pointy end of the spear when dealing with an insurgency. Now with the limited field artillery assets that are currently being deployed to battle the counterinsurgency fight, the artillery community must adapt quickly to provide the fires needed for the Soldiers on the ground. This means that the artillery has to develop better trained personnel who have the capability to operate in extreme environments, such as split battery operations for longer periods of time while still being able to mass fires, provide close supporting fires to the maneuver element they are supporting, and to defend themselves. This is just one example of how the artillery must be able to react in order to still be considered a key player on the battlefield during counterinsurgency operations.

There is an assumption across the board that the artillery causes too much collateral damage on the battlefield and in some cases will hinder counterinsurgency

operations, which is why some artillery units are being deployed to serve in other roles. In order for the artillery to be successful this mind-set must be changed through the development of better, smarter, and more accurate types of munitions available for employment in the theater. The artillery community has developed the new GPS (global position system) GMLRS (guided multiple-launch rocket system) round and successfully fired it in Iraq while fighting the insurgency, achieving outstanding results. This is just one example of what types of munitions and weapons systems that must be developed in order for the field artillery community to show it has a place in the counterinsurgency fight of today.

Historically, the field artillery has always been a key player from the US perspective in any fight. The firepower that artillery brings to bear on the enemy without endangering its maneuver elements has always been and will continue to be the key to success of the field artillery, but it needs to be continually refined in order to prove useful in the current counterinsurgency fight.

Definitions

The following definitions will be used throughout the research project.

Combat Power: Is the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. Combat power is comprised of five basic elements: firepower, maneuver, leadership, protection, and information.

Counterinsurgency (COIN): The Joint Publication 1-02 defines counterinsurgency as, “Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency” (1994, 112).

Desirable Effects: Are those that directly support the commander's objectives and operational scheme, and that comply with his guidance and intent for fires. They achieve a specified purpose in time and space.

Effective Firepower: Provides the destructive element of combat power needed to defeat an insurgency and destroys his will to fight. When used properly, firepower can set the conditions needed for successful maneuver operations to take place.

Fire Support: Joint Publication 3-09 defines fire support as fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. It is the collective and coordinated employment of lethal and nonlethal fires against targets at both the tactical and operational levels of war. The ability to employ all available fire support as a synchronized effort integrated with the scheme of maneuver is accomplished through the process of fire support planning, coordination, and execution. Effective fire support ensures that the right targets are adequately attacked to meet the commander's intended effects (1998, I-1, 2). Whereas FM 6-20 simply states that fire support is the collective and coordinated use of lethal and nonlethal fires, in a responsive, integrated, and synchronized manner, to achieve the maximum desirable effects against ground targets in support of operational and tactical combat operations, and to prevent or minimize fratricide and undesirable collateral damage. This brings me to defining exactly what is meant by both lethal and nonlethal fires throughout this paper.

Firepower: Is the amount of fires that a position, unit, or weapons system can deliver.

Insurgency: Bard O'Neill defines insurgency as a struggle between a nonruling group and ruling authorities, in which the nonruling group consciously uses political resources (e.g., organizational expertise, propaganda, and demonstrations) and violence to destroy, reformulate or sustain the basis of legitimacy of one or more aspects of politics (1990, 15). O'Neill's definition of insurgency is broader than the definition found in the Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*, which defines insurgency as "an organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict" (1994, 228). O'Neill's definition captures what type of insurgency the US Military is facing in Iraq today and is therefore more relevant to the research of this project.

Lethal Fires: as defined by FM 6-20 include armed aircraft and land-based and sea-based indirect fire systems (such as field artillery, mortars, and naval surface fires). Nonlethal fires: include electronic warfare capabilities, psychological operations, information operations, civil affairs, the use of munitions such as illumination and smoke, and nonlethal, area-type delivery systems that employ water, sticky/slicky agents, and similar materials.

Maneuver: Is the employment of forces, through movement combined with fires or fires potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance.

Overview

According to Field Manual (FM) 7-98, *Operations in a Low Intensity Conflict*, paragraph 7-2d, there are seven major areas that a field artillery unit must focus on in order to be effective in the counterinsurgency fight. These areas are:

1. The need for greater decentralization of organic, attached, and reinforcing fire support. In most cases units will have to operate more independently and sometimes in smaller elements than are commonly employed at the unit level. Whereas most light field artillery units are used to operating in battery formations they now must be able to operate in split battery formations to provide support to maneuver units during cordon and search and cordon and knock operations. The units must also maintain the ability to be able to mass fires when required, even while operating at a smaller unit as separate firing platoons.
2. Reduced ability for brigade-level control and coordination of fires within the operations area. This means that the batteries on the ground will have to be able to operate autonomously with the maneuver battalion they are in support of and conduct all clearance of fires procedures from within in order to provide the timely and accurate fires that may be needed in support of the maneuver forces on the ground.
3. Added security requirements for firing positions of indirect-fire weapons. This includes planning of direct fires for defense and coordination of US or other host nation military forces to augment the security of the FA unit. The maneuver must provide additional security elements to protect the artillery in the counterinsurgency fight.
4. A need to fire in all directions. 6400 mil operations is a must, because the enemy is located everywhere. Fires must be responsive to any unit that needs them and

the only way to provide that needed responsiveness required in a counterinsurgency environment or a low-intensity-conflict (LIC) environment is to be able to provide a 6,400-mil firing capability.

5. The artillery must be able to support local defensive forces and static security posts, such as check points, road blocks, and base camps with immediate and responsive fires if required. The checkpoints and security posts are vital assets that contribute immensely to winning the counterinsurgency fight. Therefore, the artillery has to be able to provide fires in support of these assets.

6. Clearance of fires is critical in low intensity conflict operations such as the counterinsurgency fight going on in Iraq; therefore, the proper utilization of fire support that avoids friendly/civilian casualties is a must. The artillery must minimize collateral damage in order to gain and maintain the support of the local populace in order to uproot the insurgency. Close coordination is vital with host nation military and civilian authorities to assist in the targeting process. Killing innocent civilians is an information operations nightmare in a counterinsurgency fight and must be reduced to as close to zero as possible.

7. Finally, close coordination with host country officials and with other nongovernmental agencies and organizations that are operating within the operations area is also critical to the success of defeating the counterinsurgency. In order for the field artillery to be able to attack the tasks laid out from FM 7-98 while going through the military's current transformation plan is going to require a lot of additional training at both higher and lower levels.

Limitations and Delimitation

This thesis does not attempt to cover how to integrate all fire support assets such as naval gunfire, CAS, and mortars into the counterinsurgency fight. The intent is to focus on field artillery fire support assets at the battalion and battery level to include the use of nonlethal munitions such as smoke and illumination and the use of newly developed and tested smart munitions and even some that are still under development. The thesis will also attempt to determine what the right mix of artillery units needed to support the current counterinsurgency fight in Iraq needs to be, if needed at all. Lastly the thesis will try to determine what field artillery units need to do in the COIN fight to minimize collateral damage.

Significance of Study

There is no indication that the US is going to have to face a peer competitor in the near future; therefore its main focus must be on the current counterinsurgency fight. Leadership, doctrine, and training are key to success and will allow the field artillery community to continue to take advantage of technology and be able to always support its maneuver counterparts. The war against terrorism is going to be the nation's main focus for years to come and with the military currently going through numerous rotations to Iraq, the value and relevance of knowing how to and if field artillery fires are useful in counterinsurgency operations is invaluable. Along with understanding the new concepts of how the Army must fight at the brigade combat team level, the Army must also understand how to fight a totally different kind of enemy and win.

Primary and Secondary Research Questions

The primary question that this thesis proposes to answer is, What needs to be done for future field artillery fires to support counterinsurgency operations? Before this question can be answered fully, two secondary questions must be answered first. One of the secondary research questions is, Should field artillery fires be used as a counterinsurgency weapon? The second question is, If artillery is useful in the counterinsurgency fight, what nonlethal fire support can field artillery offer to counterinsurgency operations?

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The current state of resources that address the role of how field artillery fires were used in the counterinsurgency fight are sparse, but what information that is available is very well researched. Tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) of how field artillery units were employed to support the maneuver, especially during the Vietnam era, are very robust.

The lessons learned from the field artillery community during the Vietnam era transpose directly into the heart of this paper and are a direct correlation to some of the actions that are taking place in Iraq today with the field artillery units. Initially Vietnam was a war of annihilation because that is what the Army was trained to do. This was due to the experiences that the Army had and had been trained for from World War II and the Korean War. Nevertheless, as the Vietnam War continued the Vietnam people became the center of gravity in the insurgency fight.

The history of the artillery as it was used throughout Vietnam has been captured, and this paper will attempt to fill the gap of how artillery must take these lessons learned and apply them to the counterinsurgency battle that is going on now. “The challenges peculiar to counterguerrilla warfare for the field artillery may be addressed by doctrinal and organizational studies to determine how best to employ weapons effectively” (Ott 1975, 235). Additional key elements that prove useful to the research of this thesis are the way that military assistance advisory groups (MAAG) were formed and what their relationship and roles were during the Vietnam War. This exact concept is currently

being applied in Iraq as the counterinsurgency fight continues. The current references also cover how field artillery units were assigned and displaced throughout the Vietnam battlespace and what their primary missions, roles and responsibilities were along with how division artillery (DIVARTY) commanders assigned the battalions to support the division. Artillery units throughout the Vietnam battlespace had to take on roles that in the past battles of World War II and Korea were unheard of. Artillery batteries at times had to operate independently of their parent battalions and the DIVARTY in order to provide the support that the maneuver units on the ground needed and required (Yates nd, 25). This covers the conventional threat in Vietnam and the insurgency threat in which this paper will attempt to fill in the gaps between the insurgency in Vietnam vs. the current insurgency in Iraq. The lessons learned from the Vietnam War had a far more profound effect on the national perception of insurgencies, as well as the willingness of the US Army as an institution to confront the problem of conducting counterinsurgency operations. There is also a general finding that maybe field artillery fires are not always needed in the counterinsurgency battle. The question of too much collateral damage continually arises during any study on LIC when artillery is associated and how to mitigate it. Sources reveal how reliant the United States military is on the use of firepower to stop the enemy and with that firepower how much field artillery fires were relied on during the Vietnam era. Search and destroy missions became the main effort of the infantry soldiers on the ground in Vietnam. The maneuver forces would find the enemy strong points, hideouts, and obstacles and relied on field artillery and other fire support assets to destroy them along with whatever towns or villages the enemy was located in. This was acceptable then, but the question, Is it acceptable now? is another

aspect of what this paper is attempting to capture. Another pattern that has been identified with the current studies is that none of the references have a complete picture of what exactly the field artillery's role is in the counterinsurgency fight (COIN) or LIC. Different references describe in detail what LIC is, ranging from combating terrorism, peacekeeping operations, support for insurgencies and counterinsurgencies, and peacetime contingency operations, but none of them seems to be able to tie in the functional role of the field artillery to these missions. Instead, they cover how the field artillery performed, rather than what effect did the artillery have on the enemy and the people during the COIN. This paper attempts to see if there is both a positive and negative connotation on the use of artillery fires in the fight against insurgencies from an effects point of view and how the artillery community can use these findings in order to improve upon or continually develop new and better ways to employ artillery fires in the COIN fight. Whether the local populace is "happy" or "unhappy" with the performance of artillery in their townships is an effect that must be measured in order for the artillery to be successful. None of the literature that was used in the research of this thesis attempted to cover that aspect, only the legal ramifications of collateral damage was taken into consideration at times.

Some of the literature was also useful at identifying the key assets for developing a successful counterinsurgency campaign, taking into consideration the differences in cultures between the British and US forces and the ability to take lessons learned and quickly apply them in the counterinsurgency fight. This one aspect is a critical part to the research of this thesis because change is inevitable for the artillery of the future. With the US Army going through transformation, the artillery community must be able to take all

of the lessons that were learned not only in the counterinsurgency battles of Vietnam, but also from counterinsurgency battles of allies, such as the success that the British had in Malaya and find a way to apply those successes into the counterinsurgency fight in Iraq.

There are also numerous references that provide systematic discussion of how to defeat an insurgency and the pitfalls associated with the process, but none of them mention of how to properly employ conventional units or weapon systems or even which type of units are the most beneficial to defeating an insurgency. The theories associated with these measures are great, but the soldiers on the ground must know what their role is when it comes to fighting an insurgency, not just the political steps associated with what the state and government must accomplish. Soldiers within the artillery community must fully understand what actions must accomplish at the tactical level and how those actions will influence the outcome on an insurgency. This is what this thesis tends to cover in order to bring more solidarity to the troops on the ground in the counterinsurgency fight.

The overall trend of different sources of information above is that the overall use of force is not always needed to fight an insurgency. In some cases artillery may not be needed at all. During the three phases of insurgency; the phase of contention (phase I), the guerrilla phase (phase II) and the mobile warfare phase (phase III), artillery may not be the best weapon of choice in the first two phases, but is definitely needed in phase III. Some references believe that the military can use nonlethal field artillery fires in support of counterinsurgency operations, regardless of what phase the insurgency is in.

The intent of this study is to help both maneuver and artillery units better understand how an insurgency works and what has to be done to destroy it whether it be using artillery or not. Field artillery officers need to know when artillery is being

effectively used on the battlefield and able to advise their maneuver commanders accordingly. Field artillery leadership must be able to determine if artillery fire support is no longer needed on the battlefield and be able to stand up and recommend that the fires be withdrawn or reduced. The artillery community must also be able to perform multiple roles during the counterinsurgency fight in order to remain a part of the combined arms team.

Doctrine

FM 3-0 establishes the Army's keystone doctrine for full-spectrum operations. The stated doctrine within this manual holds war fighting as the Army's primary focus and recognizes that this critical ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare means it has the ability to dominate any situation in support and stability operations or operations other than war also. The foundation of FM 3-0 is built upon global strategic responsiveness for prompt, sustained Army force operations on land as a member of a joint or multinational force.

It also provides operational guidance for commanders and trainers at all echelons. Officers and senior noncommissioned officers must read and understand FM 3-0.

The most recent source for US Army counterinsurgency doctrine is FM 3-07. FM 3-07, *Stability Operations and Support Operations*, was written with an emphasis on "supporting friendly nations operating in or threatened with potential hostilities" (2003, 3-0). The manual covers the categories of foreign internal defense (FID) from indirect support, to direct support, to combat operations. The emphasis on support to friendly nations implies the leading role that the Army expects the host nation to play. In fact, under the heading "The Role of the Army in Counterinsurgency," paragraph 3-23 states,

“Generally, US forces do not engage in combat. The threat to American interests does not support that degree of involvement, even if it were effective. An American combat role tends to undermine the legitimacy of the host government and risks converting the conflict into an American war” (2003, 3-7). The manual also states that, “Planners must understand that a basic premise of the FID program is that the ultimate responsibility for IDAD [Internal Defense and Development] rests with the HN [host nation]” (2003, 3-8).

The doctrine in the manual is very general. It describes the importance of neutralizing the insurgency by rendering it ineffective through political reform. It also addresses the importance of modifying military operations for counterinsurgency to avoid alienating the population with excessive violence: “Collateral damage destroys government legitimacy. The insurgents’ best recruiting program is indiscriminate killing and damage by government forces” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-6). The doctrine recognizes that military operations are only one facet of the strategic problem: “Military operations must complement and reinforce political, social, and economic reform” (FM 3-07 2003, 3-4). The doctrine does not address the conduct of US forces as an occupying force that has assumed the powers of sovereignty of a foreign nation. Besides eight pages on foreign internal defense, the manual also includes an appendix titled “Characteristics of Insurgency.” This appendix outlines leadership, ideology, objectives, environment and geography, external support, phasing and timing, the phases of insurgency, and organizational and operational patterns.

JP 3-07.1, Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense, is another standard reference. This manual reads much like FM 3-07, except that it covers all US forces and emphasizes the criticality of coordination and the integration

of effort among various US agencies. The manual also emphasizes the importance of providing support to the host nation, stating:

The United States will normally consider FID support only if the following three conditions exist: 1) the existing or threatened internal disorder is such that action by the United States supports US national strategic goals; 2) the threatened nation is capable of effectively using US assistance; and 3) the threatened nation requests US assistance. (JP 3-07.1 2004, 8)

JP 3-07.1 does not address the issues of conducting FID as an occupying force or establishing a military government. It stresses the need to conduct close coordination with the US diplomatic mission and the Country Team within the host nation to build an effective FID program. Neither of these structures currently functions in Iraq. JP 3-07.1 also provides a framework of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic (DIME) elements for conducting FID and stresses connectivity among these elements for an effective FID program. Like FM 3-07, it focuses on the indirect and direct support operations as those that are optimal for supporting a foreign nation's internal defense. In addressing combat operations, JP 3-07.1 states that US forces will only be a temporary combat force until the host nation can stabilize the situation. The primary role for US military forces in combat operations is to support, advise, and assist HN forces through logistics, intelligence, or other combat support, and service means. This allows the HN force to concentrate on taking the offensive against hostile elements (JP 3-07.1 2004, I-13).

The manual also states that HN forces should conduct combat operations whenever possible to increase the legitimacy of the HN government, whereas US forces, if conducting combat operations, should concentrate on force protection (JP 3-07.1 2004, IV-22, 23). Clearly, US forces are not intended to take a leading role in combat

operations, and when they do, they are intended only to conduct them insofar as required for their own protection.

There is a lot of emphasis on working with the US diplomatic effort and Country Team to build an understanding of how and when to best employ US military assets to assist in FID. JP 3-07.1 stresses the vital importance of correctly identifying the root cause of unrest so that FID efforts will apply to a long-term solution, rather than addressing a short-term symptom (2004, III-5). Human intelligence (HUMINT) rather than electronic or technical types of intelligence is identified in the manual as probably the most important type of intelligence for successful FID (JP 3-07.1 2004, IV2), and it should be backed up with a significant counterintelligence and operational security effort. Part of the HUMINT effort will be supported through training soldiers expected to operate in a FID environment. The manual recommends an emphasis on language training as much as possible to enable soldiers to operate in the environment and to facilitate cultural awareness. Standards of conduct training, training on the rules of engagement (ROE), FID principles, and force protection are also emphasized.

CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Never, never, never believe any war will be smooth and easy, or that anyone who embarks on the strange voyage can measure the tides and hurricanes he will encounter. The statesman who yields to war fever must realize that once the signal is given, he is no longer the master of policy but the slave of unforeseeable and uncontrollable events.

Sir Winston Churchill

Research Methods and Techniques

This chapter outlines the research methodology used in order to get to the ground truth about counterinsurgency and the use of field artillery fires.

The first step that will be used to gather information about field artillery fires in the counterinsurgency fight will be to take a historical approach by researching counterinsurgency battles or battles that relied heavily on the use of field artillery fires during the Vietnam era. This is to give me a baseline on where to judge how artillery was employed during the Vietnam era and to compare how the current field artillery doctrine has adapted to these concepts.

The next step is to apply a sense of validity, a doctrinal approach, to how the fires brigades and DIVARTYs were used by looking at their overall structure, TTPs, along with lessons learned from the Vietnam era and see if they can be applied to the current operations that are on going in Iraq and how they can possibly contribute to current effects-based operations (EBO) and measures of effectiveness (MOE).

The third step is to take that doctrinal approach along with lessons from the field and compare current and future doctrine associated with counterinsurgency along with

the current Army transformation concepts/programs and apply what missions the field artillery should be doing in order to be successful in the counterinsurgency fight.

These steps will allow me to make use of historical events along with the types of insurgency and the mind-set of the people during the Vietnam era and compare them with where the Army thinks it is headed today. This will give a baseline the theories and practice that the field artillery has to apply towards the counterinsurgency fight of today and in the future. Although, the new doctrine that is currently being developed has not been implemented into the units that are currently in the fight to see if it is feasible, it will give me the opportunity to compare how it has changed from the doctrine of the past. The determination of whether there are drastic changes in the way that the artillery community must conduct business is the intent of these steps.

Answering the Research Questions Step-by-Step

In order to answer the primary research question, based on historical aspects of how field artillery was used in the past to battle counter insurgency, Vietnam in particular, what needs to be done for the future field artillery fires to support COIN operations? The five critical secondary questions must be answered.

The first secondary research question, Will field artillery fires be needed in COIN operations? was addressed in order to establish if there is truly a need to have field artillery fires in the counterinsurgency fight. This question is posed to establish a baseline of the study and to identify any additional secondary questions that the research must identify in order to get to the heart of the thesis.

Moreover the questions requires a look into what is currently going on in Iraq with field artillery units and how they are being utilized and what their major purpose is

and to compare it to how the field artillery was involved in past counterinsurgency fights.

The ability to determine if field artillery is needed in the counterinsurgency fight based off of the previous factors will have second and third order effects for the field artillery community weather the answer is yes they are needed or no they are not.

If field artillery is needed in the COIN fight and can be used in a nonconventional role, what nonlethal fires or support can field artillery offer to counterinsurgency operations? is the next secondary question that must be answered. This is where some of the second and third order effects for the field artillery community will come into play. The artillery community will have to identify exactly what nonconventional role it can play in the COIN fight without the sacrifice of units losing training and proficiency on their primary weapon system to deliver lethal field artillery fires and how long it will take a unit to be retrained if it must take on a nonconventional field artillery role. These were some of the actions, which had to be taken during the Vietnam era, but were not as drastic as the military is conducting today. Field artillery units are being completely retrained and reorganized as infantry units in order to conduct missions in Iraq and the cost of this reorganization must be addressed.

The final secondary question that must be addressed is, Should field artillery fires be used as a counterinsurgency weapon?, has its own secondary questions which are: (1) How do you fight an insurgency? and (2) What are the different types of insurgencies (difference in the insurgency in Vietnam and Iraq)?

Strengths and Weaknesses of Research Methodology

From a historical aspect, the Vietnam era has been studied for a long period of time and from every angle. The Vietnam region is main source of information that is

referenced in order to capture how field artillery fires and units were used in the counterinsurgency fight. The reliability of the historical resources and data is considered a strength of the research. Doctrinally, the research attempts to capture all of the doctrine that was utilized in the Vietnam era and compare it to the most current and even new doctrine that is under development in order to capture all of the changes along with the lessons that were learned while conducting counterinsurgency operations. The use of doctrine and its reliability in this study are considered a strength.

Overall the research objective is to identify how field artillery was used in the past to battle counter insurgency, Vietnam in particular, and what needs to be done for the future field artillery fires to support COIN operations? The research method, primary and secondary research questions, reflects a reasonable, logical, and realistic approach to answering the primary research question. The researcher will minimize personal bias and sentiment by utilizing and analyzing multiple research sources and objectively articulating the collective perspective of those sources, thereby, maximizing objectivity of the outcome of this paper.

CHAPTER 4

FIELD ARTILLERY ROLE IN THE COUNTERINSURGENCY FIGHT

While the nature of warfare and crisis resolution remains unchanged, changes in the security environment, technology, and the threat will cause the conduct of military operations to change. Accordingly, the United States must change the way it conducts joint military operations [and] shift to a global perspective of the battlespace, a non-contiguous approach to operations, and employment of a fully integrated Joint Force.

Joint Operations Concept, Oct 2003

Vietnam and Iraq

As the military looks at how the field artillery was utilized in the Vietnam War, it must take into account where the artillery had been before the war started and what types of equipment the FA community was using. The field artillery community entered Vietnam with practices and procedures that had been fine tuned and further developed during the Korean War. The conventional tactics and training utilized by the artillerymen in Vietnam did not always work as planned while engaging the enemy in the counterinsurgency fight. The success of the insurgent relies on offensive actions by small units and requires rapid disengagement from the conventional or larger military force in order to survive. Major force on force engagements seldom occur. This is a basic characteristic of successful insurgency operations. Therefore, many artillery functions that were routinely reserved for and carried out by the battalion were being conducted at the battery level by junior leaders. This means that the field artillery battery level commander had to be able to orchestrate and organize the entire fire support system in support of the maneuver commander in which he supported. Competence at the battery

level and below was critical to the success of multiple missions during low intensity conflict (LIC) operations during the Vietnam era (Gregory 1991, 41).

There were also some new changes on going in the artillery community as well as in the Army as a whole. The Army had been preparing to engage the enemy on a “Dirty Battlefield,” focusing on the European theater. The new divisional structure for the Army would be called the reorganization objective army division (ROAD). As a part of this new reorganization, now called transformation, the artillery community was receiving new equipment and by the early 1960s, the Army had introduced new field pieces to its inventory: the M108 105-millimeter howitzer, M109 155-millimeter howitzer, M110 8-inch howitzer, M107 175-millimeter gun were self-propelled pieces; the M102 105-millimeter howitzer, M114 155-millimeter howitzer, and M115 8-inch howitzer were towed (Yates, nd, 23). With this noted, the Army had developed in many cases a more mobile and lethal field artillery just as transformation has done to the artillery community again.

Most artillerymen in Vietnam saw the counterinsurgency fight totally different and were ill prepared for the differences associated with the COIN fight and a conventional one. In the eyes of the artillery officers on the ground the counterinsurgency and guerilla warfare that was on going in Vietnam was a Special Forces fight. They were still focused on the force on force fight and the first initial battles of Vietnam did nothing to make them change their minds. The artillery units provided devastating firepower on units that came in contact with maneuver forces and eventually the maneuver forces would force the enemy to attack and utilized the artillery to completely destroy them. These missions were called search and destroy missions where the maneuver forces were

supporting the artillery. The artillery units in Vietnam operated and achieved their objective of destroying the enemy through mass and therefore seldom fired missions smaller than a battalion. The battalion in direct support of a brigade supported the entire brigade and the battalion fire direction center was the centralized control agency for fires. This allowed the battalion to bring all of its fires to a decisive point on the battlefield throughout the brigade area of operations and in some cases the entire division artillery was able to mass all firing units on a single target.

The war in Vietnam was a nonlinear fight. The enemy was not contained by a line of friendly forces, but rather in groups that operated throughout the country, mostly in small units, but massing formidable strength when and where they could affect the fight. Military ground operations were characterized by numerous, concurrent, widely dispersed small-unit operations. These tactics permitted continuous pursuit of the widely scattered enemy. To insure that the maximum area was defended by available troops, a section of terrain called an area of operations (AOR) was assigned to each ground unit from the highest level down, which is similar to what is on going in Iraq today. Maneuver commanders are operating out of forward-operating bases (FOB) in order to gain, maintain, and secure the areas in which they must operate in order to prevent vacuums of resistance from building and to help the people build a better Iraq. In Vietnam ground force commanders conducted operations throughout their assigned areas for similar reasons, but mainly to destroy the enemy. The divisions divided their territory into brigade areas of operations and brigades split their areas among their battalions; battalions, among their companies.

The wide dispersal of maneuver forces required significant changes in the employment tactics of supporting artillery. The size of brigade areas of operations and range limitations of the cannons prevented a direct support battalion from massing the fires of its batteries in support of an entire brigade. Instead, artillery was dispersed in order to provide the maximum area coverage, with each of the three batteries of a battalion in direct support of one of the three maneuver battalions of the brigade. The infantry battalion commander and the supporting battery commander were jointly responsible for insuring that the battery was always positioned where it could provide timely and accurate fires to the maneuver forces within the battalion.

Fire direction was no longer centralized at field artillery battalion but was decentralized to battery level or, when the battery was forced to occupy two positions, to platoon level. The primary justification for centralizing fire direction at the artillery battalion level was the ability to quickly mass fires. With the new dispersal of the artillery units, this made the massing of fires more difficult and at times impossible. Therefore the best place to control fires was at the battery level, where the commander could best direct fires for the supported infantry battalion. Firing batteries were also isolated with their supported battalions. They did not have the freedom of movement they would have on the conventional battlefield but moved with their supported infantry battalions which also provided the additional protection needed from an enemy that was all over the battlefield. The communications systems that were utilized, especially wire were extremely vulnerable to enemy actions, and the frequency modulation communications were extensively utilized for communicating beyond the major defensive positions. Firing batteries did not have freedom of maneuver because of ambushes etc., therefore they

could do very little for administrative or logistical support and relied heavily on the assistance of its parent battalion.

It was also difficult for the artillery to support some of the small units that were conducting operations in support of maneuver forces because it was extremely hard to know the exact location of the batteries, which increased the difficulty of massing of fires. The forward observers constantly updated the battery with their current locations, which was extremely difficult due to the terrain in which they had to operate in. This was a critical step in order for maneuver units to be within the artillery umbrella of effects. Mistakes in any of these calculations could have resulted in friendly casualties. This issue caused for a more positive control of the artillery by the maneuver battalion commander. The units, both the maneuver and artillery battery had to prove that they were competent in the employment of direct support artillery before any of his restrictions could be lifted. These processes was often time consuming, but once it was established and the positive control from the maneuver commander was lifted, the commander could focus his efforts and devote his attention to the maneuver plan and let the battery commander control the fires. Some of these restrictions that were being felt by the artillery in Vietnam are being felt by units in Iraq today. Units are being restricted on the types of munitions that can be employed because of collateral damage issues and because of the risk of harming innocent civilians.

The artillery and infantry were very close to one another in Vietnam and has always had a clear and understanding relationship in order to be able to provide fire support. By the units being co-located, the artillery and infantry, this caused the relationship to grow even closer and forced a greater dependency upon one another. The

artillery needed the security that was provided by the maneuver forces and the maneuver needed the fire support that the artillery delivered. This became known as the habitual relationship of the direct support battalion to the brigade and the batteries relationship that was directly associated with the supported battalion. This concept is somewhat still the same except with modularity and transformation the units are still associated with the battalion to brigade concept except the batteries do not necessarily have the habitual relationship with the battalions. In Iraq some of the artillery battalions are being placed in the role as the 3rd maneuver battalion within the brigade combat team (BCT) (Hancock 2005, 29). Either way artillery units are being given the responsibility for maneuver space just as the infantry and must still maintain the ability to deliver accurate and responsive fires when required.

The way that artillery units are being utilized in Iraq is very much the same as it was in Vietnam. Once you take out of context the caliber of the weapon system and look at the tactical role in which the artillery was given some of the similarities in Vietnam are the same in Iraq. Now that the Division Artillery command structure is gone, the Fires brigade for the division will have to fill the void. During Vietnam, the first major impact of the division artillery (DIVARTY) had to face was its inability to control the DS battalions because of the vast distances between the headquarters and because of the missions that the DS artillery units had to carry out in support of the maneuver forces, which left only the heavier artillery pieces at DIVARTY's disposal (Ott 1975, 42). They were directed to augment the fires of the direct support battalions. The Fires brigade of today's army is almost performing the exact same role. The fires brigade is the division commander's assets that can assist the BCTs organic fire support as required, without

worrying about the placement and command and control of the DS level artillery assets as the division artillery commander did.

The responsibilities of the division artillery commander grew in the sense that units were so spread out across the battlefield in Vietnam, that the re-supply and maintenance operations became extremely critical to the direct support units and therefore consumed much of the division artillery staffs time and energy (Ott 1975, 44). The sustainment operations of the direct support artillery units of today are handled at the maneuver brigade. The maneuver brigade has an organic Brigade Support Battalion which provides all of the direct support capabilities directly to the Brigade Combat Team (BCT). The BSB works directly for the BCT commander who is ultimately responsible for ensuring that all units within the BCT is properly sustained. The DS artillery battalion commander works directly for the BCT commander and continually advised the brigade commander on artillery issues (ST 63-1 2005, 3-17). The division artillery commander was also responsible for contributing forces, weapons, and equipment to the defense of the division base camp or for directing the entire base camp defense or as it is currently being called in Iraq today, the FOB.




Figure 1. Brigade Support Battalion

Source: Department of the Army, FM 3-21.31, *Brigade Support Battalion* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2003), 1-19, figure 1-12.

This transition brought about being able to win the support of the local populous in order to be successful in the counterguerrilla war. The division artillery shortly became consumed with the integration of the added requirement of civil affairs and nondivisional fire support systems, such as Air Force strategic bombers, naval air support, and naval gunfire. These are just a few of the tasks that the artillery community is being asked to

conduct today in Iraq. In Vietnam as a part of the counterguerilla fight, field artillery was positioned where it could best provide maximum coverage to local population centers, lines of communication, and government installations. Firing units answered calls for fire support from any friendly party, civil or military, within range. The locations of the firing units were carefully planned in order to provide the overlapping fires needed to prevent any gaps in coverage. This placement was also critical when other means of fire support were required on any given mission. The artillery community has been coordinating the effects of multiple assets on the battlefield, whether they are lethal or nonlethal for some period of time and is not going to change in the near future.

The artillery community also quickly learned that the enemy was all around and needed to be able to fire 6400 mils for perimeter protection, which led to the development of fire support bases (FSBs). The artillery had to be able to protect themselves and the maneuver command post located in the FSB by any means necessary. Artillery pieces were utilized in direct fire mode as well as having to fire in support of other FSBs as required. Artillery was also used in order to prep landing zones and conduct artillery raids that the pieces in the FSBs could not range to support the maneuver forces. Finally just as some artillery units are being used in Iraq today, where artillery was present but not necessarily needed the artillerymen were employed as light infantrymen or other places they were needed in order to assist with the counterinsurgency fight. These artillery units that were taken out of their primary military occupational specialty lost the proficiency they had once had on their howitzer or as a member of the fire direction center. These issues were brought about because of the massive collateral damage that was being caused by artillery counter-fire, search and destroy missions, and the harassment and interdiction

fires. The artillery community was not necessarily in the winning of the “hearts and minds” of the people of Vietnam. The guys on the ground were there to destroy the enemy forces and to provide close supporting fires to the maneuver elements within their area of operations.

“The US Army's experience in Vietnam showed that developments and refinements in Army doctrine, organization, and materiel must help to realize the maximum effectiveness of American fire power in future conflicts” (Ott 1975, 231). Just as the major focus of a conventional threat was during the Vietnam era, which was the Soviet Bloc and Warsaw Pact countries, the threat must be known at all times and units must train and prepare to defeat-deter these threats as required. The first priority to fight this threat during the Vietnam era was to training, organizing, and equipping US forces to fight on the terrain of fully developed countries against a sophisticated, armor-heavy enemy. It was also noted that this was not the only threat during that time and the military forces had to be prepared for not only the big armor war, but they had to be prepared for any situation that could arise. The Army had to be prepared for the counterguerilla threat. The field artillery community approached the doctrinal development of both fights in ways that were equally applicable and important.

The primary training focus of field artillery was on survival. Artillery fires had to be accurate and lethal, which required the fire plans to be able to be executed in a timely fashion to support units that were in contact. The overall goal was timely and accurate fires to support the maneuver scheme which seldom required the use of artillery in a close and continuous fight to suppress enemy fires. In the battle of Khe Sanh, artillery rounds were in flight in as little as forty seconds to support maneuver units that were in contact

(Ott 1975, 231). This was not always the case as the rules of engagement and issues with the clearance of fires came to the forefront, artillery fires were accused of being slow and untimely by the maneuver forces. This caused the artillery community to develop new techniques and doctrinal approaches to how the unresponsive problem would have to be fixed. In order to achieve the accuracy required by the maneuver units, the artillery would conduct double and triple checks which made the delivery of fires process extremely slow. Training strategies and plans were designed to achieve a quicker and more accurate clearance of fires process which allowed for a faster response time without degrading the concern for safety and accuracy. The training also proved to be invaluable in either a COIN or conventional-linear type conflict.

The target acquisition process was also an integral part of the package deal needed in order to be successful in both the COIN fight and the conventional-linear one. In Vietnam the field artillery community was poor at detecting and finding enemy artillery and mortars. This was due to the fact that no emphasis had been placed on continually developing the radar systems needed in order to make the counter-fire fight a success. The Army was more focused on the development of weapons and the mobility of the force during the 1960's, therefore overlooking the need to improve the capability to bring survey forward and get it to the firing units in a timely manner and the 1950's MPQ-4A fire finder radar, which had an extremely small search fan and could not track low flying projectiles. The enemy was completely aware of the limitations with the fire finder radar and ensured that their rocket and mortar fires were initiated outside the scan sector of the radar in order to achieve effects on US forces. This prevented the artillery community from locating and conducting counterfire missions on enemy mortar, artillery,

and rocket fires. Therefore the artillery community continually relied on forward observers which were augmented by aerial observers as the primary means to identify artillery targets (Ott 1975, 179).

The artillery school knew that changes had to be made in the advancement-modernization-acquisition of not only improved survey and fire finder radar capabilities, but where to best place these assets in order to have the greatest effect on the battlefield. Central control of these critical assets at the Corps Artillery and Division Artillery level was not necessarily the right answer. The assets needed to be at the lower levels where the fires could be more responsive in support of the maneuver elements on the ground.

Vietnam also showed the importance of the fire support coordinator and forward observer. The proper planning of fires and the ability to maintain situational awareness on the battlefield were critical in both battling an insurgency and during the high-intensity conflicts. Commanders on the ground were confident that their maneuver plan could be easily supported by fires with minimal guidance and supervision. This also led to the artillery community being the proponent for the clearance of airspace. In Vietnam, the fire support officer coordinated all of the activities within the target area to include the airspace. This decision was made because it was basically looked at as an extension of his duties within the target area and later evolved to the fire support officer clearing all of the airspace within the area of operations. This resulted in the FSO issuing advisories to all aircraft operating within the area. Artillery liaison sections, particularly at maneuver battalion and brigade levels, spent the majority of their time controlling, or managing, air traffic, at times making it their primary duty for which they were organized and equipped. Today the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) is the controlling agency

for the deconfliction of airspace. The JFACC still allows the Army to manage airspace over the battle area, but understands that it can not operate today the way operations were conducted in Vietnam.

The artillery community also recognized the need for artillery systems with increased ranges during Vietnam in order to effectively mass fires and to provide increased coverage for maneuver forces throughout the area of operations. The artillery community also realized that this capability was needed for both the counterinsurgency fight as well as for a conventional fight. Today the artillery community has realized the need for not only systems that provide increased ranges, but smarter munitions that provide more accurate destruction of the target with less collateral damage in order to be a viable option in the counterinsurgency fight.

The Vietnam War prompted the artillery community to rethink all of the aspects of the field artillery, including its organizational structure, roles and responsibilities, and modernization standards, in order to be successful in any type of conflict, whether it be a counterinsurgency fight or a conventional high-intensity conflict. Vietnam also provided the US Army a way in the future that it may have to fight a counterinsurgency war.

In conventional operations, missions seldom are assigned to artillery units smaller than battalion. A battalion in direct support of a brigade supports the entire brigade rather than assigning one of its batteries to each of the brigade's battalions. To control the fires of its three batteries, the battalion establishes a centralized fire direction center. Centralized control permits the battalion to bring all the fires of its batteries to bear at any point in the brigade sector. This massing of fires is possible because all batteries are likely to be well within range of the entire brigade front. In fact, combat power might be

so highly concentrated in some instances that all the artillery of a division can be massed on a single target.

These lessons learned from Vietnam should have been known and applied to the thought process of how to employ artillery during Operation Iraqi Freedom once the fight turned into a counterinsurgency fight. The complete transformation of artillery units into light infantry, military police, and transportation units was not a new thing. These additional units were needed during the Vietnam era and again during OIF. The artillery community must understand that this type of transformation does not come without a cost. That cost is soldiers and leaders losing valuable skills needed to perform their MOS. In some cases cannon crew members have been away from their MOS for 18-24 months and move to a unit that expects that young sergeant or staff sergeant to be able to lead young soldiers on the field artillery weapon system that they are the chief of. This is an injustice to the sergeant and the young soldiers that he has to train and to the artillery community as a whole. Therefore systems must be developed in order to ensure that units that have to conduct a tasking of being an MP or converting to a trucking company are able to maintain the core competencies of delivering field artillery fires.

Doctrine

“The doctrine holds warfighting as the Army’s primary focus and recognizes that the ability of Army forces to dominate land warfare also provides the ability to dominate any situation in military operations other than war” (FM 3-0 2001, vii). The Army's Mission Essential Task List (METL) is the key to the doctrine of how the Army trains. Units must take these METL task and develop their warfighting tasks in order to be

successful in the current operational environment of today just as they were during the Vietnam era. The first task on the Army's METL is to "Shape the Security Environment."

The foundations of field artillery are tied into the overall fire support structure that is based on the elements of combat power, the principles of war, the operational framework, and the tenets of Army operations (figure 2). The elements are combined in order to provide the basis for the generation of overwhelming effects. The right effects at the right place and time enable the force to successfully accomplish its mission, whether those effects be kinetic or nonkinetic. The field artillery falls within the realm of the firepower element of combat power.

The principles of war provide a set of time-tested guidelines for combining the elements of combat power and employing fire support. The operational framework relates the activities of combined arms forces in time, space, and purpose. It provides commanders with a conceptual basis for applying combat power. Within the operational framework, fire support contributes to the accomplishment of decisive, shaping, and sustaining operations to achieve the overall METL task of shaping the security environment.

The tenets of Army operations build upon the principles of war and describe the characteristics of successful operations (see figure 2). To apply this concept to fires within the current operational environment, the threat dimension is the first dimension that must be fully understood in order to properly plan for and employ fire support assets in the counterinsurgency fight. The threat can range from a large conventional military that is backed by a state actor or to a terrorist or a common criminal. In the counterinsurgency fight the threat is not the same in all areas and has to be dealt with in

different ways. The insurgent's main goal is just like any other threat on the battlefield, and that goal is to inflict as many casualties as possible and to prolong the conflict. The longer the conflict or insurgency goes unresolved the better chance the insurgent has of survival. The artillery community must understand this critical dimension first and foremost in order to develop ways to neutralize the threat and provide support to maneuver. Measures of effectiveness have to be developed in order to mitigate the threat and gain support of the local populace. This is where the FSCOORD or ECOORD has to understand and incorporate the tenets of Army operations into fire support planning.




Figure 2. Foundations of Fire Support
Source: Department of the Army, FM 3-09 (6-20) Final Draft, *Foundations of Fire Support* (Washington, DC: Headquarters, Department of the Army, 2005), 1-2

Lethal fires by the artillery community were extensively used in Vietnam throughout the campaign. These fires enable the units in action to achieve their desired purpose at the specified place and time without regard to the collateral damage that the artillery fires were creating. In today's war on terror, the lethal fires that are delivered from the artillery are less and less. Field artillery is the primary means of fire support in

“fire and maneuver” type operations. Not only because the artillery community can deliver effects using organic assets, such as cannon, rocket, and missile systems, but because it is the integrator of all fire support assets that are available on the battlefield to support the commander. However, there is a limit on when, where and how to properly employ the right fire support assets of the artillery community while simultaneously minimizing the collateral damage that the munitions can possibly cause. This situation has required the artillery community to develop more and more precision munitions that are available at the lower levels of command and that are able to be employed in a timely manner to support the forces on the ground.

The effects received from the fires element directly support the commander’s objectives, operational scheme, and his intent for fires. Field Artillery fire support operations are always in support of the maneuver forces commander where it provides responsive and accurate fires and effects to achieve the following missions of delay, disrupt, divert, and limit enemy forces, combat formations, systems, functions, and facilities. In order to achieve these missions the fires must be synchronized. This coordination required the interaction of all fire support assets on the battlefield, which include but are not limited to the target acquisition systems, joint fires, command and control of fire support systems, and thorough coordination across the force in order to create the conditions that favor the coalition forces throughout the entire area of operations.

The field artillery is the linchpin to successful fire support integration and synchronization with combined arms operations. The field artillery commander serves as the force commander’s FSCOORD. The field artillery organization provides the nucleus

for effective fire support coordination through staff personnel, fire support agencies, and attack resources (FM 6-20 1988, 1-2),

In order to apply the above fire support doctrine in today's battle against an insurgency the artillery community must be integrated into the current counterinsurgency doctrine. FM 3-07.22 DRAFT establishes the fundamental principles for military operations in a counterinsurgency environment. The FM takes the lessons that have been learned in past insurgencies and counterinsurgencies to give the current force that is fighting in the Global War on Terrorism some fundamental basics on how to engage and win against an insurgency.

This FM also describes how three different men visualize how to successfully defeat an insurgency. First, it examines how Colonel T. E. Lawrence looked at an insurgency and gives a brief overview of the six principles in which he developed. These are the principles in which an insurgent must be able to accomplish in order to be successful. The six principles from *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom* are:

1. A successful guerrilla movement must have an unassailable base. This means that the insurgent must be both physically and psychologically safe from the counterinsurgency force. The insurgent must have some form of support from the local populace in order to succeed in his missions and must be able to blend into the population at will.

2. The insurgents must have a technologically sophisticated enemy. This will allow the insurgents an opportunity to possibly interdict or hinder both the logistics and communications assets of the counterinsurgency force, which in the insurgents mind will be a critical vulnerability of the counterinsurgents.

3. The enemy must be sufficiently weak in numbers so as to be unable to occupy the disputed territory in depth with a system of interlocking fortified posts. This provides the insurgents with seems to which he can easily maneuver undetected throughout the battlespace and increase his ability to successfully carry out attacks against the counterinsurgents.

4. The insurgents must have at least the passive support of the populace, if not its full involvement. If the local populace ignores their presence and turns a blind eye to their operations, then the insurgent is given free reign to operate in a particular community allowing him to conduct operations at will and maintain fairly safe while doing so.

5. The irregular force must have the fundamental qualities of speed, endurance, presence, and logistical independence in order to survive.

6. The irregular must be sufficiently advanced in weaponry to strike at the enemy's logistics and signals vulnerabilities in order to cut off the counterinsurgents lines of communications.

Next it looks at the findings of Sir Robert Thompson (UK) and David Galula (France). Sir Robert Thompson's principles to successfully defeat an insurgency are as follows from *Defeating Communist Insurgency*:

1. The government must have a clear political aim: to establish and maintain a free, independent, and united country which is politically stable and viable.
2. The government must function in accordance with law.
3. The government must have an overall plan [that includes all areas which have a bearing on the insurgency].

4. The government must give priority to defeating the political subversion, not the guerrilla.

5. In the guerrilla phase of an insurgency, a government must secure its' base areas [both the populace and geographical] first.

David Galula states the following six principles in order to defeat an insurgency from *Counterinsurgency Warfare, Theory and Practice*.

1. The support of the population is as necessary for the counterinsurgent as it is for the insurgent. The population is the center of gravity for both the counterinsurgents and the insurgents. The insurgents understand this important aspect and therefore his goal is to create disorder among the population. Disorder is easy to create from the insurgents' viewpoint and hard to control from the counterinsurgents, but in order to gain and maintain the support of the population, order must be maintained or the insurgents win.

2. Support is gained through an active minority. For both the counterinsurgent and the insurgent the active minority is the key. There will always be an active minority for the cause, a neutral minority, and an active minority against the cause. The key to success is to turn the insurgent's active minority in the counterinsurgent's favor in order to successfully defeat the counterinsurgency.

3. Support from the population is conditional.

4. Intensity of efforts and vastness of means are essential. All of the issues within a country cannot be completely solved simultaneously and therefore, the efforts must be focused in certain areas or even in multiple regions that are operating at different stages or levels of completeness to rid the insurgency simultaneously.

5. Use and create: economy of force; irreversibility; initiative; full use of COIN assets; simplicity; control, assess, and verify.

6. A COIN victory is the destruction in a given area of the insurgent's forces and his political organization PLUS the permanent isolation of the insurgent from the population, an isolation not enforced upon the population but maintained by and with the population (FM 3-07.22 DRAFT 2005, 8).

Complexity in COIN requires an adaptive mindset, critical and flexible thinking, intuitive reasoning, and decision-making. COIN takes place in and around a foreign culture, thereby creating greater complexity. Soldiers and Marines can no longer simply coordinate with units on the left and right, and destroy concentrations of enemy soldiers in the zone ahead. The insurgents will hide among the populace to gain anonymity, and avoid concentrating in the open. Insurgents will attack military and security forces when they are most vulnerable in order to undercut the legitimacy of the local government and their ability to secure the populace. Insurgents want to disrupt HN security force actions and thereby exert a coercive influence on the populace to gain their support. The security forces' goal then becomes to identify, isolate, and eliminate the leaders, their cadre, and infrastructure from among the populace. When engaging the insurgents initially, engagements must be precise in order to harm only the insurgents and safeguard the people and property we are protecting. Military and HN security forces must be involved with most activities that facilitate normal life in order to influence the neutral majority to actively support the legitimate government. That influence with the people develops as security forces disrupt insurgent activities, and deny insurgency influence on the populace, and identify and eliminate the insurgent leaders and political infrastructure. The leadership, mindset, and critical thinking that support a 24/7 presence, coordination with security force leaders, the application of people observation-and-questioning skills, and the capture and elimination of insurgent leaders is only the beginning of the complexity. (FM 3-07.22 DRAFT 2005, 1-3)

Basic Tasks of Fire Support

There are four basic fire support tasks that must be accomplished in order to properly support maneuver elements whether operating in a linear or nonlinear fight. These tasks are (1) support the forces in contact, (2) support the concept of the operation, (3) synchronize fire support, and (4) sustain fire support. All of the tasks listed above

have to be nested into the commander's intent in order for artillery to provide adequate support in the counterinsurgency fight or any other fight that the artillery may be engaged in. In order for the artillery to be able to support the local government and the local populace while assisting in the killing, capturing, or elimination of insurgent leaders and weapon systems, fires must be placed precisely and under certain circumstances not fired at all.

The fire support coordinators must understand the big picture and how to use and how not to use the field artillery fire support assets that are available. The FSCOORD must be able to present commanders with alternative options on how to properly utilize all of the fire support systems at his disposal. The commander must be afforded the opportunity to achieve the level of effectiveness and synergy necessary to conduct decisive operations across the entire area of operations (AOR). One misplaced artillery round could cause just as much or more damage to the overall mission at hand than the insurgents do by causing the local population to lose faith in the coalition's ability to provide adequate protection to their families.

Keeping these factors in mind, the fire support community must always be able to support the forces in contact, which is a critical task that does not necessarily go away just because an insurgency fight is on going; it just takes a better understanding of how to properly utilize all the fire support assets that are located within the area of operations. The traditional roles of close supporting fires, counterfire, and interdiction do not necessarily go away in the counterinsurgency fight and therefore make the artillery community a relevant force or asset in Iraq. It is better to have the capability on the ground and not to need it than to need it and not have it.

Although the counterinsurgency fight is not a purely kinetic type of battle, the artillery community still has a place in it. The artillery community must continue to stay on top of and refine the targeting process in which the HVTs are derived. The targeting process feeds directly into the commander's intent for fires and the concept of the operation, which is another basic task of fire support. This requires the FSCOORD to closely interact with the G3 and other staff agencies in order to ensure that all fires on the battlefield are nested. In the counterinsurgency fight, the fires that are required are not always lethal ones.

The artillery community must continue to integrate all of the nonlethal players on the battlefield and understand what capabilities they bring to the table. Some missions may only require the use of psychological operations assets in order to accomplish the effects that the commander wants to achieve while other may require a "battery two rounds" from a 155 paladin battery. It is the FSCOORD's, G3's, responsibility to ensure that the right asset is employed at the right time and place against the right target set.

Fire Support and the Principles of War

The nine principles of war defined in FM 3-0 provide general guidance for conducting war and military operations other than war at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. They are fundamental truths governing combat operations. The principles are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine (FM 3-0 2001, 4-2).

1. Objective: Direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and attainable objective (FM 3-0 2001, 4-12).

The spirit and other moral qualities which animate an Army, a General, or Governments, public opinion in provinces in which a War is raging, the moral effect of a victory or of a defeat are things which in themselves vary very much in

their nature, and which also, according as they stand with regard to our object and our relations, may have an influence in different ways (Clausewitz 1968, 251)

In the counterinsurgency fight the fire support plan is not necessarily planned around an objective but more in line with what effect the commander must achieve in order to be successful in a certain area or province. The commander's intent plays a crucial role in how the fire support systems are aligned with the specific targeting requirements and the clearly defined objective according with the principles of war.

2. Simplicity: Prepare clear uncomplicated plans and clear, concise orders to ensure thorough understanding (FM 3-0 2001, 4-15). There is no simple process of how to employ fire support assets in a counterinsurgency fight. Just as in Vietnam, the fires may have to be planned all around for the protection of the force and therefore simple is out of the question. Simplicity is more in line with everyone having a clear and concise understanding of how the fire support assets will have to be employed when required. The maneuver forces must also understand that fire support assets may not always be the correct answer to a problem they may have, but the artillery must remember that one of the key tasks for fire support is to provide fires to forces in contact which implies an obligation to protect the force. For this reason, the development of essential fire support tasks (EFST) is extremely important. The FSCOORD must outline the task, purpose, method and desired effects that fires must achieve in order to support the maneuver commander.

3. Offensive: Seize, retain, and exploit the initiative (FM 3-0 2001, 4-13). Artillery is never held in the reserve and in some cases must be utilized to attack the enemy throughout the battlespace. In the counterinsurgency fight, the artillery fires are not necessarily held in reserve, but more on the lines of they must always be readily

available if needed. Again this principle of war works great for fires in the conventional force on force fight but has to be refined as the fight transitions into a counterinsurgency fight.

4. Mass: Concentrate the effects of combat power at the decisive place and time (FM 3-0 2001, 4-13). Fire support systems must continue to be able to mass all of the effects throughout the battlespace whether in a force on force conventional fight or in a counterinsurgency fight. The FSCOORD must be able to direct all fire support assets at the decisive point on the battlefield at any given time.

5. Maneuver: Place the enemy in a disadvantageous position through the flexible application of combat power (FM 3-0 2001, 4-14). Fire support systems must maintain their mobility throughout the area of operations. Mobility is the key to the success in both the conventional fight and the counterinsurgency fight. With mobility comes the ability to mass fires or conduct counter fire missions over a wide front or even throughout a contiguous or noncontiguous battlefield. The bottom line is that the field artillery fire support systems and personnel must be flexible in order to accomplish their mission.

6. Unity of Command: For every objective, ensure unity of effort under one responsible commander (FM 3-0 2001, 4-14). Synchronizing fires into the scheme of maneuver is the key to unity of command. All fire support elements on the battle field must be able to act as one complete cohesive unit in order to properly support the commander's intent for fires. The FSCOORD is the linchpin to ensure that all fires are properly integrated and that all units on the battlefield are operating under a common operational picture with the same endstate or effects that must be achieved in mind.

7. Security: Never permit the enemy to acquire unexpected advantage (FM 3-0 2001, 4-14). Fire support systems must always be able to adequately support the forces in contact and simultaneously be able to adequately sustain and protect themselves. Security of the force is of the utmost importance, but at the same time too much caution can cause a delay in the delivery of fires which negates the artillery's primary mission of support the maneuver force, therefore risks have to be taken to ensure that an adequate level of security is present in order to ensure the timely and accurate delivery of fires.

8. Surprise: Strike the enemy at a time or place or in a manner for which he is unprepared (FM 3-0 2001, 4-14). Field artillery provides the maneuver commander the ability to provide shock and awe on enemy positions with the instantaneous delivery of fires without warning.

9. Economy of Force: Allocate minimum essential combat power to secondary efforts (FM 3-0 2001, 4-13). Commanders must know what the minimum essential fire support that is required for a particular mission. In order to properly employ fires across the battlefield effectively the targeting methodology of decide, detect, deliver, and assess (D3A) must be tied into economy of force principles so that fire support assets are employed where they can achieve the desired effects of the command.

By comparing how field artillery was utilized in Vietnam with how it is being employed in Iraq today, both with respect to the doctrine then and current doctrine numerous past lessons emerge on how to properly employ artillery in the counterinsurgency fight. The current development of new doctrine and tactics, techniques, and procedures that are being used in the Iraq AOR focuses on these lessons once again and incorporates them into ongoing operations in theater. Commanders must

remember that the artillery is more than a pool of soldiers and leaders that can be retrained or given additional missions as infantry, transportation, and military police. The artillery can provide the much needed fires and effects required in the counterinsurgency fight.

Fighting a successful counterinsurgency requires a nesting between the desired ends of US Policy to a correct strategy developed by the Armed Forces of the United States in conjunction with the interagency. Only by creating a balance between the desired ends and the ways and means available, can an effective counterinsurgency strategy be achieved that will create a lasting solution that is tolerable to all the actors involved. The desired ends at the strategic level must be nested in the objectives at the Theater strategic level, and the nesting of those objectives in the subsequent tasks being performed at the operational and tactical levels. Only by ensuring the nesting between the different levels of war can we hope to achieve the desired strategic outcomes and effects by operational and tactical actions. It is important for leaders to understand the links so that tactical operations can facilitate the achievement of operational goals, and thereby the strategic ends. The focus will be on the command and control, coordination, roles, and planning considerations of the operational and tactical levels of war. (FM 3-07.22, CH 3)

As FM 3.07.22 states that the strategic level must be nested with the operational and tactical level of war during the counterinsurgency fight, the maneuver forces and fires must also be integrated at the tactical level. The maneuver commander must carefully look at the nine principles of war as it relates to the field artillery to allow for the proper employment of the artillery in the right capacity. This will ensure that fires and maneuver are properly nested and that the desired effect is achieved.

CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The field artillery role in the counterinsurgency fight is not so much the delivery of field artillery fires, but the coordination of all fires, both lethal and nonlethal across the contemporary operating environment. The field artillery community must get their hands around the “Fires and Effects Coordination Cell” or “Effects Coordination Cell,” whichever it is going to be called, and determine what the major role is going to be. Right now field artillery units are continuing to support other agencies by transforming into transportation, infantry, and military police units just as some artillery units had to do during the Vietnam era. The big question is how long can the field artillery community sustain this, without there being substantial losses with regards to the readiness of the units taking on these missions to perform their field artillery roles of the delivery of fires? How long can the young section chiefs and soldiers be expected to be able to perform these duties and possibly PCS to another unit and be expected to execute their core artillery tasks of delivering fires upon arrival when they have not been operating on a howitzer or launcher for a year or more?

Although there is a scarcity of hard evidence to prove that artillery units have lost basic gunnery skills because of numerous nonstandard missions ongoing in Iraq. An article in the *Colorado Springs Gazette* questions the possible inadequate training or loss of gunnery skills of artillery soldiers currently serving in Iraq with the 3rd Battalion, 29th Field Artillery because of a firing incident that killed three Iraqi civilians. According to Tom Roeder of the Gazette, “In Iraq, the brigade has sporadically used the Paladin howitzer to respond to insurgent and mortar attacks. Because artillery use is rare, soldiers

trained to fire the howitzer have become jokingly known within the brigade as “infatillery” - artillery soldiers who work as infantry on such tasks as convoy protection and house-to-house searches” (Roeder 2006, 1). This is an example of how the impact of nonstandard missions for the artillery can possibly affect the delivery of fires process.

This is not a new observation by any means. In a 2002 interview with General (retired) Montgomery C. Meigs about peacekeepers in Bosnia and Kosovo, he addressed some of the same issues.

About 50 percent of everything we do in Bosnia and Kosovo are skills that you would need in a big war. Move the platoon, go into a staging area, run an operation, or do patrolling. That's all the stuff you do in combat. Now, we aren't doing a battalion movement to contact, but I can get that back up to speed within four months after that unit comes home. So there is a short term degradation of some collective skills and to some extent their gunnery skills, which we get back six months after that unit returns. In the long run we are building in the muscle and bone fiber of the officer and noncommissioned officer corps of our Army a level of experience that is unprecedented. (TWT 22-147 2002, Meigs)

There is some risk in assigning the artillery additional missions and still expect them to provide accurate and timely fires in support of maneuver forces. The biggest risk is that it may take up to six months after the unit redeployed home in order to provide fires for maneuver forces.

Therefore integration of the nonlethal fires and other agencies on the battlefield is a key to the success for the artillery in the counterinsurgency fight. The artillery community must continue to wrap their hands around the planning and employment of the nonlethal assets just as it has for the lethal fires piece. The artillery community is not the owner of these nonlethal assets, such as psychological operations, information operations, computer attack, civil affairs, and other agencies, but it must be able to understand how all of these agencies have to interact with one another and consider these

assets as a part of the fire support arsenal. The artillery community must also know how to effectively employ these assets and be able to tie them in to the commander's overall scheme-intent for fires. Simultaneously, the field artillery community must stay on top of the delivery of lethal fires. Although lethal fires are not needed as much in the current operating environment, the accurate delivery of those fires still remains a core artillery task.

The continued and simultaneous use of artillery units as maneuver units, transportation units, or military police units will affect the ability of the artillery to accurately and timely deliver fires. This problem is not only for the artillery community, but for the Army as a whole. The accurate and timely delivery of artillery fires is a perishable skill and some field artillery units, soldiers and leadership are entering a second and even a third deployment to Iraq as a unit other than artillery. Field artillery staffs are being deployed to control convoys and truck battalions rather than plan for and control the delivery of field artillery fires. If these deployments continue at this rate without the ability to sustain adequate training plans to ensure that the core tasks of the artillery units are in place and met, the artillery community will be hurting in future operations that may require the field artillery to operate in its assignment of tactical missions which are Direct Support (DS), Reinforcing (R), General Support Reinforcing (GSR) or General Support (GS) roles (figure 3).

| INHERENT RESPONSIBILITIES OF FIELD ARTILLERY MISSIONS | | | | | |
|---|--|---|---|--|----------------------------------|
| AN FA UNIT WITH A MISSION OF | DIRECT SUPPORT | REINFORCING | GENERAL SUPPORT | REINFORCING | GENERAL SUPPORT |
| | 1. Answers calls for fire in priority from.. | 1. supported Unit 2. Own Observers1 3. Force FA HQ | 1. Reinforced FA 2. Own Observers1 3. Force FA HQ | 1. Froce FA HQ 2. Reinforced unit 3. Own Observers1 | 1. Force FA HQ 2. Own Observers1 |
| | 2. Has as its zone of fire.. | Zone of action of supported unit | Zone of fire of reinforced FA | Zone of action of supported unit to include zone of fire of reinforced FA unit | Zone of action of supported unit |
| | 3. Furnishes Fire Support Team (FSST/FIST)2 | Provides temporary replacements for casualty losses as required | No requirement | No requirement | No requirement |
| | 4. Furnishes liason officer.. | No requirement | To reinforced FA unit HQ | To reinforced FA unit HQ | No requirement |
| | 5. Establishes communications with.. | Company FSOs, FSOs, and supported maneuver unit HQ | Reinforced FA unit HQ | Reinforced FA unit HQ | No requirement |
| | 6. Is positioned by.. | DS FA unit commander or as ordered by force FA HQ | Reinforced FA unit or as ordered by force FA HQ | Force FA HQ or reinforced FA unit if approved by force FA HQ | Force FA HQ |
| | 7. Has its fires planned by.. | Develops own fire plans | Reinforced FA unit HQ | Force FA HQ | Force FA HQ |
| 1 includes all target acquisition means not deployed with supported unit (radar, aerial observers, survey parties, etc.) 2 A fire support section (FSS) for each maneuver brigade/battalion/calvalry/squadron and one FIST with each maneuver company/ground cavalry troop are trained and deployed by the FA unit authorized these assets by TOE. After deployment, FISTS and FSSs remain with the supported maneuver unit throughout the conflict. | | | | | |

Figure 3. Inherent Responsibilities of Field Artillery

Source: Headquarters, Department of the Army, FM 6-20, *Inherent Responsibilities of Field Artillery* (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1988), 42, figure 2-3.

Field artillery units in Iraq today still have to conduct some of the missions that were required in the Vietnam era. Examples of these missions include providing support for cordon and searches and separate artillery batteries operating totally independent in support of different maneuver units that they may or may not have a habitual relationship with such as was required during the takedown of Fallujah.

Collateral damage must be minimized when utilizing the lethal field artillery fires during operations that require targets or buildings to be attacked by lethal munitions. The artillery community must continue to develop more precision guided munitions that are available to lower level commanders in order to allow for timely delivery of fires that the maneuver units require while simultaneously minimizing collateral damage that is caused. The employment of these precision-guided munitions will allow the artillery community to deliver fires in a counterinsurgency fight without destroying critical infrastructure that is required for the reconstruction efforts in Iraq.

Measures of effectiveness must be clear and delineated in order for the effects coordination cell to adequately plan for and apply both lethal and nonlethal fires. The senior fire support officer on staff (FSCOORD) must understand measures of effectiveness and how best to recommend what the field artillery community can bring to the table. In order for the artillery to have a place in the counterinsurgency fight, every artilleryman must be able to tie the artillery into the current scheme of maneuver.

Artillery is not going to win the hearts and minds of those local nationals that are neither supportive to an insurgency organization nor against it, but it will provide the protection for the Soldiers on the battlefield. Bottom line is that artillery fires are needed in the current counterinsurgency fight in Iraq. Whether artillery fires are needed continuously or not is another question that needs to be addressed and whether the artillery community will suffer, with respect to the delivery of fires in the future because of the additional missions or roles that units have been given is a question that can only be answered by time.

What is the role of field artillery in the counterinsurgency fight? The role of the artillery is to provide the much needed effects on the battlefield whether it is lethal or nonlethal and continue to integrate all fire support assets as required. Artillery fires may not be the only choice that comes to mind when engaging the enemy. Artillery has proved itself to be very effective in Vietnam as a part of the counterinsurgency fight when needed and again has proved that it is still relevant today in the counterinsurgency fight and operations that are on going in Iraq. Artillery is another asset on the battlefield that is at the commander's disposal in order to continue to influence the outcome within his area of operations. LtGen Sattler said it best when asked, "What message would you like to send Marine and Army Artillerymen stationed all over the world?"

You Artillerymen are very adaptable and versatile. In urban counterinsurgency operations in Fallujah II, sometimes the Artillery shaped and maneuver forces went in behind vice maneuver forces going in and the Artillery taking out targets in front of and around them. Sometimes maneuver supported fires, and other times fires supported maneuver.

In counterinsurgency operations in Iraq some Artillery units operate as maneuver or MP units and conduct civil-military operations, information operations, and other nontraditional missions. With your intelligence, flexibility and adaptability, you can contribute all across the spectrum, from Phase I to Phase IV, in any type of operation, but especially in counterinsurgency operations. (Hollis 2006, 9)

The artillery is still very much needed and is relevant in the counterinsurgency fight. Lessons from Vietnam demonstrated how to increase the utility of field artillery fire support assets when dealing with an insurgency threat. The fires must be observed and accurate in order to achieve the desired effect required to support the command. Just as the artillery community did in Vietnam, artillery Soldiers must understand the basic infantry tactics of raids and patrolling. These tasks were critical in Vietnam and are also critical in Iraq and must be continually incorporated into the offensive operations directed

at destroying the insurgency. Artillery units operating as a part of the counterinsurgency fight must be well trained and able to operate and conduct more decentralized operations and even have to control or have their own battlespace.

Future field artillery units that will have to conduct counterinsurgency operations must fully understand what role they will be playing once the unit is deployed into the theater of operations. To be successful and for artillery to contribute to the COIN fight the unit must be prepared to be able to control a portion of the brigade's battlespace just as a maneuver task force would and be able to provide close supporting fires and counterfire for a forward operating base (FOB) when needed. This means that the artillery community must constantly maintain the ability to quickly and accurately deliver fires in support of the maneuver forces on the ground. Whether in a conventional force on force fight or in counterinsurgency operations the field artillery will always have to be prepared to deliver fires.

GLOSSARY

Antiterrorism (DOD) Defensive measures used to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorist acts, to include limited response and containment by local military forces. Also called AT. See also antiterrorism awareness; counterterrorism; proactive measures; terrorism.

Combat power: is the total means of either or both destructive and disruptive force that a military unit-formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. Combat power is comprised of five basic elements: firepower, maneuver, leadership, protection, and information.

counterguerrilla warfare (DOD, NATO) Operations and activities conducted by armed forces, paramilitary forces, or nonmilitary agencies against guerrillas.

Counterinsurgency (DOD) Those military, paramilitary, political, economic, psychological, and civic actions taken by a government to defeat insurgency. Also called COIN.

Desirable effects: are those that directly support the commander's objectives and operational scheme, and that comply with his guidance and intent for fires. They achieve a specified purpose in time and space.

Effective firepower: provides the destructive element of combat power needed to defeat an insurgency and destroys his will to fight. When used properly, firepower can set the conditions needed for successful maneuver operations to take place.

Fire support: Joint Publication 3-09 defines fire support as fires that directly support land, maritime, amphibious, and special operations forces to engage enemy forces, combat formations, and facilities in pursuit of tactical and operational objectives. It is the collective and coordinated employment of lethal and nonlethal fires against targets at both the tactical and operational levels of war.

Firepower: is the amount of fires that a position, unit, or weapons system can deliver.

Foreign internal defense (DOD) Participation by civilian and military agencies of a government in any of the action programs taken by another government or other designated organization to free and protect its society from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. Also called FID.

Insurgency (DOD, NATO) An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. DOD Dictionary (as of 05 12 06)

Insurgent (DOD) Member of a political party who rebels against established leadership.
See also antiterrorism; counterinsurgency; insurgency. DOD Dictionary (as of 05 12 06)

Internal defense and development (DOD) The full range of measures taken by a nation to promote its growth and to protect itself from subversion, lawlessness, and insurgency. It focuses on building viable institutions (political, economic, social, and military) that respond to the needs of society. Also called IDAD. See also foreign internal defense.

Lethal fires: as defined by FM 6-20 include armed aircraft and land-based and sea-based indirect fire systems (such as field artillery, mortars, and naval surface fires).

Maneuver: is the employment of forces, through movement combined with fires or fires potential, to achieve a position of advantage with respect to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Maneuver is the means by which commanders concentrate combat power to achieve surprise, shock, momentum, and dominance.

Nonlethal fires: include electronic warfare capabilities, psychological operations, information operations, civil affairs, the use of munitions such as illumination and smoke, and nonlethal, area-type delivery systems that employ water, sticky-slicky agents, and similar materials.

Subversion (DOD) Action designed to undermine the military, economic, psychological, or political strength or morale of a regime. See also unconventional warfare.

Unconventional warfare (DOD) A broad spectrum of military and paramilitary operations, normally of long duration, predominantly conducted through, with, or by indigenous or surrogate forces who are organized, trained, equipped, supported, and directed in varying degrees by an external source. It includes, but is not limited to, guerrilla warfare, subversion, sabotage, intelligence activities, and unconventional assisted recovery. Also called UW.

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